

一、個案分析(一)(25%)

請根據以下個案資料，回答個案中所提出之問題。(請分點作答，並敘明理由)

大忠公司創立於1966年，董事長陳大偉先生是由中本紡織公司提前退休後自行創業，經營紡織及針織業務。當時營業額約為新台幣50萬元，經過20餘年之慘淡經營及全體員工之努力，該公司目前已成為全國排名100名以內之企業集團，年營業額達新台幣180億元。其產品主要區分為消費品與工業品兩種，詳細如下：

消費品：成衣、服飾、電腦、電視

工業品：產業機械、石化原料、重電機設備

陳董事長很早就為公司之接班問題預做準備，公司總經理係由其弟陳大剛先生擔任。其公子陳小龍在日本神戶大學獲得經營學博士學位，即回國擔任生產副總之職務。次子陳小虎在美國南加州大學獲得博士學位，亦立即回國擔任行銷副總之職務。目前公司之運作表面上看起來似乎十分穩健，但公司內部卻暗潮洶湧，主要之問題點如下：

- 年輕一輩之經理人與董事長及總經理之間有代溝，許多問題無法開誠佈公來講，造成冰山一角。
- 由於受教育背景不同，使陳小龍與陳小虎兄弟兩人在經營管理之理念及制度方面之看法南轅北轍，且在許多正式開會場合常常爭執不下，其他主管看在眼裏，不知如何化解兩人之爭端，更不知聽誰的才好。
- 大忠公司有相當不錯的經營團隊，卻缺乏完整之中長程策略規劃目標，因而造成管理能力及執行能力不足，使這幾年之獲利能力每況愈下。

陳董事長對於公司目前及未來發展之情況頗為憂心，正在思考如何進行組織改造，使公司能步上正軌。

1. 試就您所知，由決策模式、組織設計與運作、目標管理、激勵制度及工作價值觀等角度，說明一般所謂日本式管理模式與美國式管理模式之異同點。
2. 我們常說一個組織是否能運作成功，要看高階之企劃能力，中階之管理能力及低階之執行能力。試說明在進行每一階層之目標設定與控制時，應注意那些因素。而這三個階層又應該如何互動才能使組織之運作更為順暢？
3. 假設您是個案公司之總經理，請問您認為公司應如何在組織設計、權力運作及管理模式等方面進行改變才能使公司之衝突減小，績效增加。

二、個案分析(二)(25%)

請根據以下個案資料，回答個案中所提出之問題。(請分點作答，並敘明理由)

Sunbelt Recreation is a manufacturer of small camping trailers, fishing equipment, hunting equipment, outdoor apparel and bowling balls/supplies. The various lines manufactured by the company vary in success. Statistics on them are as follows :

	Sunbelt's Market Share	Industry Growth Rate	Leader's Market Share
Trailers	49%	3%	19%
Fishing equipment	9%	5%	9%
Hunting equipment	14%	6%	29%
Apparel	4%	11%	15%
Bowling Ball	5%	2%	37%

1. Explain to the company why they might benefit from treating the above product lines as business units. Why must they use care in defining them as separate units.
2. What insights would be provided by analyzing these units in a BCG growth-share matrix format?
3. What particular problems in interpretation of the matrix should be understood?
4. Provide some strong specific rebuttals to the following statements:
  - a. By increasing market share, the return on investment for the business will increase.
  - b. The firm should have extensive market power due to its high market share.
  - c. Competition is not of particularly high concern for Trailers since Sunbelt is the clear market leader.

### 三、個案分析(三)(25%)

請根據以下Gillette Co. (吉利公司)之個案資料,回答個案中所提出之問題(請分點作答,並敘明理由)。

#### Gillette Co.

Several mornings a week, Alfred M. Zeien performs an odd ritual. After lathering his face, he shaves with two razors—one for each side of his face.

Then he runs his fingers over his cheeks to check the closeness of the shave. "That's the only way to really compare shaves," declares Mr. Zeien, chairman and chief executive officer of Gillette Co., who tests both his company's razors and competitors'.

Gillette is a company obsessed with shaving. How many whiskers on the average man's face? Thirty thousand, by Gillette's count. How fast do men's whiskers grow? By 15/1,000ths of an inch a day, or 5½ inches a year. Dry beard hair, Gillette has determined, is about as tough as copper wire of the same thickness.

"We spend more time than you can imagine studying facial hair growth—which is quite different from the growth of other hair on your head—because that's the way to improve your product," explains the very clean-shaven Mr. Zeien, who keeps a drawerful of experimental Gillette blades in his office for trying out.

In the annals of American business, few companies have dominated an industry so much and for so long as this one. "Gillette was the lead brand in 1923 and is the lead brand in 1992," says Jack Trout, a marketing consultant. And not by a little: Its 64 percent share of the U.S. wet-shaving market (in dollars) compares with 13 percent at No. 2 Schick, a unit of Warner-Lambert Co.

But Gillette is one of America's noteworthy corporate successes not just because it has done so well, but also because it once blundered so remarkably—and came back.

In 1962, a small foreign company, Wilkinson Sword Ltd., introduced the first coated stainless steel blade, cutting sharply into Gillette's market share. Swallowing its pride, Gillette came out with its own stainless steel blade.

Humbled, Gillette used the experience to learn lessons many companies don't learn until too late: Never take a rival for granted, no matter how small. Don't concede market niches to competitors, because niches have a way of growing. And don't dally in bringing out new products for fear of cannibalizing old ones; if you don't bring them out, a competitor may.

"Every American corporation of any great size or importance was founded on a core business. Why didn't certain of those companies survive, or [survive] only in a diminished way? They took their eye off the core business," contends Milton Glass, Gillette's vice president of finance. "Gillette

has never done that. Each morning Gillette executives face south, to south Boston"—home of its biggest plant, which churns out nearly 2 billion blades a year—"and bow to our razor-blade business. Everything else is secondary."

Gillette so dominates shaving worldwide that its name has come to mean a razor blade in some countries. It is the leader in Europe with a 70 percent market share and in Latin America with 80 percent. Indeed, for every blade it sells at home, it sells five abroad, a figure likely to grow as joint ventures expand sales in China, Russia, and India.

Retaining its dominance in razors also has meant spending hundreds of millions of dollars to develop the innovative twin-blade Trac II razor in 1972, the pivoting-head Atra in 1977, and the hugely successful Sensor, with independently suspended blades, in 1989. It also meant rushing out—albeit reluctantly—a disposable razor in 1976 to fend off French rival Soci t  Bic SA, even though the cheap throwaways cut into sales of higher-profit Gillette products.

While shaving will account for only a bit more than one third of Gillette's \$5 billion in sales this year, razors will ring up nearly two thirds of profits of \$500 million—attesting to the manufacturing efficiencies and profit margins that go with its dominance [Exhibit 1].

Gillette's performance in other businesses—deodorants, pens, cosmetics—is decidedly mixed. Braun electric shavers and small electric appliances and Oral-B toothbrushes, bought when they were small companies, have grown rapidly under Gillette. While Braun isn't dominant in electric razors, it is a major player, enabling Gillette to hedge its bet by being in a business that holds a steady 30 percent share of the shaving market.

But Right Guard deodorant, once the leading brand, has been surpassed by rivals. Bic clobbered Gillette in disposable lighters, prompting Gillette to sell its Cricket business. And in writing instruments, Gillette's Paper Mate and other brands produce only so-so profits and growth. Efforts to diversify into everything from hearing aids to eyewear have flopped.

Those problems, combined with the growing market share of low-margin disposable razors, slowed Gillette's sales and earnings growth in the 1980s. Corporate raiders launched hostile takeover bids, criticizing management as lethargic, while some dissident shareholders waged a proxy battle to oust some directors.

Although ultimately unsuccessful, those attacks moved Gillette management to act. The company slashed its bloated staff by 8 percent. And to stem the growth of throwaway razors, Gillette tried a risky strategy—positioning its new Sensor as an alternative to lower-priced disposables. It worked.


Mustaches and beards are rare among Gillette managers, and not only because of a corporate fondness for clean-shaven cheeks. Gillette is a conservative company that expects slavish devotion from its managers, many of whom are 30- and 40-year veterans. Indeed, the only time Gillette ever reached outside for a top executive was in the early 1970s, when it hired marketing whiz Edward Gelsthorpe as president. Known as "Cranapple Ed"—for introducing the Ocean Spray cranberry and apple juice drink—he lasted just 15 months at Gillette. He won't comment, but insiders say he simply didn't fit in.

Those who aren't passionate about Gillette need not apply. A business-school graduate, assured of a position with Gillette after several interviews, was asked in a final meeting whether she had any qualms. Half in jest, she said, "Well, I'm not sure I want to spend the rest of my life worrying about underarms." She didn't get the job.


Nowhere is the obsession more evident than at the South Boston manufacturing and research plant. Here, some 200 volunteers from various departments come to work unshaven each day. They troop to the second floor and enter small booths with a sink and mirror, where they take instructions from technicians on the other side of a small window: try this blade or

EXHIBIT 1 Gillette: On the Cutting Edge


**A Dominant Market Share . . .**  
 Gillette's share of dollar sales of the U.S. wet shaving market



**In Its Core Business . . .**  
 Sales in 1991, by business line




**Leads to Rising Profits . . .**  
 Net income, in millions of dollars



\*Estimate  
 Source: Gillette

**And a Soaring Stock**  
 Year-end closing stock prices, adjusted for splits



\*As of Dec. 9, 1992

that shaving cream or this aftershave, then answer questionnaires. Besides men's faces, the research includes the legs of women volunteers; women account for 29 percent of razor sales in the U.S.

"We bleed so you'll get a good shave at home. This is my 27th year. I came here my first week. Haven't missed a day of shaving," says George Turchinetz, manager of the prototype model shop, proudly noting that he is a "preferred" tester because he is "real fussy."

For a close look at the mechanics of shaving, Gillette uses a boroscope—a video camera attached to a blade cartridge using fiber optics. Magnifying the film hundreds of times, researchers can precisely determine how twin blades catch the whiskers, pull them out of the follicles and cut them. Sometimes they collect debris after test shaves and measure the angle of the cut whiskers: the flatter the angle, the less force it took to cut the hair.

"We test the blade edge, the blade guard, the angle of the blades, the balance of the razor, the length, the heft, the width," explains Donald Chaulk, vice president of the shaving technology laboratory. "What happens to the chemistry of the skin? What happens to the hair when you pull it? What happens to the follicle? We own the face. We know more about shaving than anybody. I don't think obsession is too strong a word."

He pauses. "I've got to be careful. I don't want to sound crazy."

Despite the conservatism of Gillette, its research and development effort is a testament to risk taking. At any given time, Gillette has up to 20 experimental razors in development. One promising prototype has been in the works for four years—and won't be ready for eight more. "We're spending more than \$1 million a year on that project, knowing we can't launch till 2000 or 2001," says Mr. Zeien, the chairman. "That's assuming we'll overcome the technical barriers, and we're not sure we can."

To the astonishment of many, both inside and outside Gillette, the strategy worked. Since Sensor was introduced in 1989, the market share of disposables in dollars has declined to 45 percent from a peak of 49 percent. Though Schick has followed with a variation of the flexible-blade idea, called the Tracer, no rival has yet reproduced the Sensor design—in part because the manufacturing equipment needed to make it is so expensive and complicated.

What's next? Gillette has a Sensor II in development that company officials vow will "supersede" Sensor. "That's one of the successes of the Japanese: They always have their next play in hand when making their current play," says Scott Roberts, the Gillette vice president.

And in another move from the Japanese playbook, the next generation razor isn't likely to be introduced first in the United States, says Mr. Zeien, the chairman. "This is what the auto companies learned from the Japanese," he says. "If you want to be a leader on a global basis, you can't just be a leader in your home market."

1. 試以SWOT分析之概念，說明欲針對吉利公司未來之營運進行策略規劃時，應進行那些內外部環境分析？而個案公司之強勢、弱勢、機會、威脅各為何？
2. 試以權變理論中策略配合 (Strategic fit)之概念，說明像吉利公司這樣一個高科技導向之市場領導者，在經營目標之擬定，競爭策略之選擇，組織結構之設計及市場之區隔與定位等方面應如何配合才能使公司之績效更為顯著？
3. 試由風險分攤(Risk sharing)，範圍經濟(Economics of Scope)及國際競爭優勢(International Competitive Advantages)等角度，說明吉利公司在決定未來之投資及成長方向時，應考慮那些事項？

#### 四、個案分析 (四) (25%)

請根據以下Goodyear公司之個案資料，回答個案中所提出之問題 (請分點作答，並敘明理由)。

THE TIRE BUSINESS isn't game of long passes and thrilling broken-field runs but of four-yard advances in clouds of gritty dust. Yet when a team is captained by an all-American like Goodyear Tire & Rubber CEO Stanley Gault, it can be an exciting game nonetheless.

And a winning game: Since Gault joined the team in 1991, after 11 brilliant seasons leading the Rubbermaid squad, Goodyear has gone from its first yearly loss in two generations, just before he joined, to 1993's championship earnings of 388 million, second highest in company history. That leaves the other giants in the international league badly behind. Says competitors Hubertus von Gruenberg, chairman of Germany's Continental tire company: "Stan Gault is setting the world standard of profitability."

Gault has pursued a double mission during what started as a three-year contract. First—the old news —was shrinking and restructuring, selling off inessential business, reducing the work force, cutting costs, raising equity, and slashing debt. The 1-million-a-day debt service alone was eating Goodyear alive. Says Gault: "The company could not survive carrying that horrendous burden."

As the company was slimming down, Gault attacked the second and really creative task: putting some profitable growth on the board. His strategy: Find and seize the industry's fastest-growing, highest-margin markets. If need be, create them.

In a commodity business, that means looking for specialty niches. So Gault set Goodyear's product development people to brew up a flood of new products distinctive enough to command a premium price. In the past two years, 22 creations have tumbled out of the factories, much more than in any previous two-year period in Goodyear's history.

Gault understood that, while the automakers who buy about half of Goodyear's tires are sophisticated engineers who specify precisely what they want, the consumers who buy replacement tires can be lured by attractive features that intelligent marketing can divine. For Goodyear developers, this new marketing savvy made all the difference. The marketers discovered not only what consumers wanted but also what the tires should look like. To buy a high-traction tire, says Joe Gingo, vice president for worldwide tire technology "the consumer has to look at the tire and say - traction."

Everyone knows about Goodyear's first new-product success, the much advertised Aquatred, a tire with a furrow down the center for wet traction. Premium priced, it accounts for 6% of Goodyear's volume and 8.5% of profits. Stiff-arming competitors crowding in with copycats, Goodyear has just introduced the son of Aquatred, a tire boasting not one but two grooves, designed to provide wet traction combined with high performance when dry.

Other new-product winners, collectively more important than Aquatred, are much less well known. For the free-spending owners of sports cars, Goodyear has concocted complete sets in which each tire, slightly different, is designed for a specific wheel, so consumers buy them four at a time, not one by one. Tires for four-wheel-drive vehicles offer a jazzy appearance and three bands of tread in differing patterns and materials. The five replacement passenger tire models introduced in 1992 and 1993, though only 14% of unit volume, account for 16.5% of revenues and a spectacular 20% of gross profits.

Not all Goodyear's children can be above average; its margin laggards are tires sold to carmakers. But Gault is widening profits on them as well by concentrating on the high-margin, high-performance tires manufacturers put on four-wheel-drive vehicles, vans, and pickups. Goodyear dominates this category, so fast growing it has jumped from 10% of the market in 1987 to 23% today.

To boost his replacement-tire business further, Gault changed his retail distribution strategy. Goodyear had sold only through independent dealers, whose business was stagnating. Says Gault: "Too many people were telling us that it was not convenient for them to purchase Goodyear products, because there wasn't an outlet where they referred to shop." So he started selling through Sears, Wal-Mart, and other mass merchants. Of course the independent dealers protested vehemently, but Goodyear is helping to reenergize them with lots of marketing and advertising support plus all those new products. Result: Sales to dealers rose 2% in 1993, a flat year for the U.S. replacement auto tire market.

Gault's contract was to expire in June, but the board has extended it until yearend. He grows vague if asked when he's really leaving: "We are not going to hold to any specific hour or day." Perhaps he'll captain Goodyear for yet one more championship season.

1. According to the case material, what are the key success factors (KSF) for Goodyear under the leadership of Stanley Gault? Explain why?
2. If Goodyear intends to proceed with growth through integration and diversification, what will be the optimum alternatives to achieve this strategy?
3. As a market leader, what defensive strategies may be adequate for Goodyear to protect its market share?