

一、個案分析(一) 25%

試根據以下之個案資料，回答以下各題：

1. 試說明服務業(特別是休閒服務業)在關鍵成功因素的掌握方面與製造業有何不同?
2. 如個案中所述，兩個新設之遊樂園對大陸人來說應為新產品，試以「問題兒童」產品的角度來說明，如何使此一新產品能夠儘快讓消費者接受。
3. 試說明如何進行服務業之 SWOT 分析，並進一步評估個案中所訂定之營業目標是否合理?

個案(一)

**Riding the American
Dream**

The opening of two international standard amusement parks in Shanghai is a mere appetiser for a feast of American style theme parks about to be served up across China. Hong Kong based American dream Park and Entertainment Group (ADPEG), owner of one of the new Shanghai extravaganzas, has invested US\$600 million in five exotic theme parks that will introduce China to the wonders of modern fairground technology. Oriental Studio 2000, three times the size of US Disneyland, is slated to open in Guangzhou early this year, while other launches are planned in Wuhan and Chengdu in 1998 and Beijing in 1999. ADPEG plans to capitalise on China's newly created leisure market with a slew of hi-tech, Disney style rides. At Shanghai's American Dream park, fairground goers will be treated to a cross section of Western civilisation including Main street USA, the Wild West, *USA Today*, a medieval village and a children's treasure island. This fantasy theme contrasts to the traditional rollercoaster commonly found in Chinese fun-fairs, or the Bring-the-World-to-China approach of Shanghai's new Window of the World style museum park.

Located about 30kms northwest of the city, the Shanghai Global Paradise features carefully crafted scale replicas of a vast selection of world landmarks. Sharp-eyed Westerners may be surprised to find an ancient American castle that bears a striking resemblance to Disneyland's Cinderella Mansion. The park has also imported a circus troupe from Eastern Europe, a Russian chorus-line of dancers and a team of Western high divers who perform hair raising stunts into tiny pools of water.

While there can be no doubting the sheer size of these new ventures, quite what locals will make of the cultural imperialism remains to be seen. The overtly American orientation of the parks has already attracted criticism from the Chinese press. Presumably this is exactly

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what the Central government has in mind when it warns of the dangers to the purity of Chinese society by Western influences. Then there is the problem of cost. The prohibitively expensive US\$12 entry fee makes ADPEG's annual projection of three million local visitors seem unrealistically optimistic.

二、個案分析(二) 25%

試根據以下之個案資料，回答以下各題：

1. 試說明高科技產業與傳統產業在組織運作及經營管理方面有哪些不同？
2. 何謂企業家(Entrepreneur)精神？試由企業文化、風險承擔及團隊合作等角度說明企業家風格(Entrepreneur style)有何特色？
3. 試以女性特質的觀點，說明女性經理人在領導與溝通方面有哪些優劣點？

個案(二)

Kim Polese

WEB ENTREPRENEUR

Give Kim Polese credit; at age 9, she knew she wanted to start her own company. "I just didn't know whether it was going to be ice cream or software," she says, laughing.

The dairy counter's loss is the information age's gain, since Polese oversees a year-old Silicon Valley start-up called Marimba Inc. If influence means setting important agendas, then Polese, Marimba's resident proselytizer and chief executive, is the most influential Web entrepreneur of this online generation-that is, the past six months. For Marimba's turf is push media: online material sent to individual computers automatically, without users' having to pull it down from Websites themselves. The push idea has been around since early 1996, when Point-cast popularized the notion of streaming media-offering stock quotes, sports scores, news headlines and the like. But it was Marimba that made push the defining Web vision last October with Castanet, a system that offers streaming software, the actual applications-from spreadsheets to video games-whose efficient transmission will turn the Web into all-encompassing information appliance its adherents have been promising.

At 35, Polese already has a proven knack for sinking her teeth into the Next Big Thing. The University of California, Berkeley biophysics major cut those teeth doing tech support in the futuristic arena of artificial intelligence at Intellicorp and Sun Microsystems. It was at Sun in the early '90s that she hooked up with a project code-named Oak, which grew into Java, the programming language that brought interactivity to the Web and Polese to public attention as the engaging face of what to most was an incomprehensible software product. With a core

team of Java programmers, Polese lit out from Sun to found Marimba and change the world.

She hopes to make barrels of money. That won't be easy; in just six post-Castanet months, a host of combatants, including Netscape and Microsoft, have entered the fray. But by stamping the future with Marimba's push-software brand and doing so as one of the high-tech world's rare women executives, Polese has earned an honored place as the Web's 1997 It Girl.

三、個案分析(三) 25%

試根據以下之個案資料，回答以下各題：

1. 何謂學習型組織 (Learning Organization)，學習型組織與一般企業組織有何不同？
2. 試說明就策略性人力資源的觀點而言，一個學習型組織應如何進行策略規劃來達成公司之目標？
3. 試由企業文化的形成、目標與策略方案之共識、人員之訓練與成長、組織結構之改造及各部門績效之評估等角度說明如何衡量一個學習型組織之學習效果。

個案(三)

Rover Group - UK, The Corporate Learning Process

The Rover Group is Britain's largest motor manufacturer, formed from Austin Rover in 1986 and from 1988-94 a subsidiary of British Aerospace, (In 1994 Rover Group was purchased from British Aerospace by BMW (Germany).) Since the late 1980s it has achieved a striking turnaround story, becoming a highly competitive, versatile, high-quality business in a very tough world environment.

When Graham Day joined the company as CEO in 1986, at a low point in its history, he saw the need to focus on its people as well as on its products, profits and processes, if Rover was to reach and maintain world-class excellence. He spearheaded a major and continuous investment in the development of employees, and the launch of Rover Learning Business was one manifestation of that commitment.

Since 1988 the group underwent major changes in its organization, systems and processes. It formed close partnerships with its dealers, and established a strategic alliance with Honda UK. The latter influenced many innovations including a total quality strategy, just-in-time, cell structures, flexible working practices, and the introduction of sophisticated technology into its production systems.

Rover now officially aspires to be a learning organization, that is, one which has the

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following characteristics:

- *A memorable and compelling vision* (Rover's vision is to be "internationally renowned for extraordinary customer satisfaction").
- *Corporate objectives* constituting the most important subgoals of the team, necessary and sufficient to achieve its mission (at Rover there are four key business thrusts).
- *Aligned and dynamic business processes*, with corporate learning its one of the key processes. (At Rover, corporate learning is one of nine key business processes as well as being one of three primary drivers for the key business thrusts.)
- *Management-led learning* (By early 1993 25% of line managers at Rover were fully responsible for creating a learning environment and for coaching a significant number of Rover's 30,000 + employees. By the end of 1994 the percentage will have risen to 75%).
- *Learning is not only a primary business driver but also enhances the quality of on - going strategic decision - making at all levels, and ensures the supply of effective leaders for the future.* This closing of the strategic loop is arguably the most difficult and uncertain of all stages to achieve or to measure, but it has to be a defining characteristic of the learning organization.

Rover's corporate learning process permeates its business strategy, serving the needs of the eight other business processes as well as having its own vision, strategy and plans. It consists of 13 simple steps and incorporates line management ownership, employee involvement, best practice by reference to past internal trends and external benchmarks, and regular milestones against which progress towards achieving targets can be monitored and measured.

The pace of change and the degree of business success achieved by Rover in the late 1980s and early 1990s have been remarkable. Belief in the powerful top and line managers, and the motivation to learn and develop among its top and line managers, and the motivation to learn and develop among its associates (employees) has been evidenced in two striking ways: in the detailed 75% response rate to an unprecedented survey covering every member of the group, in 1988, asking for their views and suggestions related to learning and development. There are now learning resource centres on every Rover site, and they are in continuous use by associates; personal development files are increasingly popular, and, as already noted, about one-third of managers are now involved directly in the development and guidance of personal

development plans for their associates.

四、個案分析(四) 25%

試根據以下之個案資料，回答以下各題：

1. 透過競爭優勢來追求成長是現代企業經營的重要成功要素，試由 BCG, GEGrid 及 Ansoff's Growth Matrix 舉例說明不同競爭位置之產品應如何追求不同之成長策略。
2. 國際行銷的困難度往往比國內行銷要高很多，試評估影響 Kodak 及 Fuji 在推動國際行銷成功發展之關鍵因素。
3. 試由挑戰者、防禦者及跟隨者的角度，舉例說明 Kodak 與 Fuji 在雙方攻防的過程中，可以採行那些策略。

個案(四)

Kodak and Fuji Fight It our Internationally

For more than 100 years, Eastman Kodak has been known for its easy-to-use cameras, high-quality films, and solid profits. But during the past decade, Kodak's sales have flattened and its profits have declined. Kodak has been outpaced by more innovative competitors, many of whom are Japanese, who introduced or improved upon 35-mm cameras, videocameras, and one-hour film-processing labs. However, when Fuji Photo Film Company moved in on Kodak's bread-and-butter color film business, Kodak took the challenge seriously.

When Fuji entered the U.S. film market, it offered high-quality color films at 10% lower prices than Kodak was offering and beat Kodak to the market with high-speed films, Fuji also pulled off a major marketing coup by outbidding Kodak to become the official film of the 1984 Los Angeles Summer Olympic Games. Fuji's share of the huge U.S. color film market grew to more than 8% in 1984, and it announced its goal of winning a 15% market share, Fuji's U.S. sales were growing at a rate of 20% a year - much faster than the overall market - growth rate.

Kodak fought back fiercely to protect its share of the U.S. film market. It matched Fuji's lower prices and unleashed a series of product improvements that culminated in its Ektar 25, 125, and 1,000 films. Kodak outspent Fuji by 20 to 1 on advertising and promotion, paid \$10 million to obtain sponsorship of the 1988 Summer Olympics in Seoul, South Korea, and snapped up the rights to the 1992 Olympics in Barcelona. Through these and other moves, Kodak has successfully defended its U.S. market position. Fuji has not been able to entice many consumers to abandon Kodak's familiar yellow and black film box to reach for Fuji green. By the early 1990s, Kodak's share of the U.S. market had stabilized at a whopping 80%.

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But Kodak took the battle a step further - it attacked Japan, Fuji's home turf. Kodak is no stranger to international marketing: 40% of its \$17 billion in sales come from 150 countries outside the U.S. In fact, Kodak has been selling film in Japan since 1889. But until a few years ago, the company didn't give the Japanese market much attention. Recently, however, Kodak has taken several aggressive steps to increase its Japanese presence and sales. It set up a separate subsidiary - Kodak Japan - and tripled its Japanese staff. It bought out a Japanese distributor and prepared to set up its own Japanese marketing and sales staff. It invested in a new technology center and a large Japanese research facility.

Finally, Kodak greatly increased its Japanese promotion and publicity. Kodak Japan now sponsors everything from Japanese television talk shows to sumo wrestling tournaments.

Despite these strong efforts, it may be as hard for Kodak in Japan as for Fuji in the U.S. Fuji, with more than \$3 billion in annual sales, has the resources to blunt Kodak's attack. The Japanese giant is firmly entrenched with a 70% share of the Japanese market versus Kodak's 15%. Moreover, high tariffs on foreign film protect Fuji's interests. Still, Kodak will gain several benefits from its stepped-up attack on Japan. First, Japan offers big opportunities for increased sales and profits - its \$1.5 billion film and photo paper market is second only to that of the U.S. Second, much of today's new photo - graphic technology originates in Japan, so a greater presence in Japan will help Kodak keep up with the latest developments. Third, owner - ship and joint ventures in Japan will help Kodak better understand Japanese manufacturing and obtain new products for the U.S. and other world markets. Kodak already sells many Japanese - made products under its own name in the U.S.: Kodak video cameras are made by Matsushita, its video tape by TDK Electronics. Kodak owns 10% of Chinon Industries, which makes the company's 35-mm cameras. Kodak sells film-processing labs made by Japanese manufacturers, and its medium - volume copiers are made by Canon.

Kodak reaps one more important benefit from its attack on the Japanese market: If Fuji must devote heavy resources to defending its Japanese home turf against Kodak's attacks, it will have fewer resources to use against Kodak in the U.S.