

※ 考生請注意：本試題不可使用計算機。 請於答案卷(卡)作答，於本試題紙上作答者，不予計分。

1. 請解釋何謂價值鏈 (Value Chain)，並說明價值鏈管理對企業有何重要性。接著請佐以一企業實例，並分析此企業在價值鏈管理上的利弊得失。(30%)
2. 請比較多國籍企業的策略型態中，global strategy、multi-domestic strategy 和 transnational strategy 間的異同，並各舉一企業實例加以說明。(30%)
3. 請於閱讀下頁段落後，回答以下兩個問題：
 - (1) 作者對 Uber 的看法為何？(30%)
 - (2) 你同意作者的看法嗎？為何同意或不同意？(10%)

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Is Uber a Disruptive Innovation?

Let's consider Uber, the much-feted transportation company whose mobile application connects consumers who need rides with drivers who are willing to provide them. Founded in 2009, the company has

enjoyed fantastic growth (it operates in hundreds of cities in 60 countries and is still expanding). It has reported tremendous financial success (the most recent funding round implies an enterprise value in the vicinity of \$50 billion). And it has spawned a slew of imitators (other start-ups are trying to emulate its "market-making" business model). Uber is clearly transforming the taxi business in the United States. But is it *disrupting* the taxi business?

According to the theory, the answer is no. Uber's financial and strategic achievements do not qualify the company as genuinely disruptive—although the company is almost always described that way. Here are two reasons why the label doesn't fit.

Disruptive innovations originate in low-end or new-market footholds. Disruptive innovations are made possible because they get started in two types of markets that incumbents overlook. *Low-end footholds* exist because incumbents typically try to provide their most profitable and demanding customers with ever-improving products and services, and they pay less attention to less-demanding customers. In fact, incumbents' offerings often overshoot the performance requirements of the latter. This opens the door to a disrupter focused (at first) on providing those low-end customers with a "good enough" product.

In the case of *new-market footholds*, disrupters create a market where none existed. Put simply, they find a way to turn nonconsumers into consumers. For example, in the early days of photocopying technology, Xerox targeted large corporations and charged high prices in order to provide the performance that those customers required. School librarians, bowling-league operators, and other small customers, priced out of the market, made do with carbon paper or mimeograph machines. Then in the late 1970s, new challengers introduced personal

copiers, offering an affordable solution to individuals and small organizations—and a new market was created. From this relatively modest beginning, personal photocopier makers gradually built a major position in the mainstream photocopier market that Xerox valued.

A disruptive innovation, by definition, starts from one of those two footholds. But Uber did not originate in either one. It is difficult to claim that the company found a low-end opportunity: That would have meant taxi service providers had overshot the needs of a material number of customers by making cabs too plentiful, too easy to use, and too clean. Neither did Uber primarily target nonconsumers—people who found the existing alternatives so expensive or inconvenient that they took public transit or drove themselves instead: Uber was launched in San Francisco (a well-served taxi market), and Uber's customers were generally people already in the habit of hiring rides.

Uber has quite arguably been increasing total demand—that's what happens when you develop a better, less-expensive solution to a widespread customer need. But disrupters *start* by appealing to low-end or unserved consumers and then migrate to the mainstream market. Uber has gone in exactly the opposite direction: building a position in the mainstream market first and subsequently appealing to historically overlooked segments.