

國立成功大學
110學年度碩士班招生考試試題

編 號： 29

系 所： 台灣文學系

科 目： 外文文學文獻解讀（英文）

日 期： 0202

節 次： 第 4 節

備 註： 不可使用計算機

※ 考生請注意：本試題不可使用計算機。請於答案卷(卡)作答，於本試題紙上作答者，不予計分。

1. Please translate the following passage into Chinese: (25%)

The Chinese diaspora, understood as the dispersion of “ethnic Chinese” persons around the globe, stands as a universalizing category founded on a unified ethnicity, culture, language, as well as place of origin or homeland. Such a notion is highly problematic, despite its wide adoption and circulation. A Uigur from Xinjiang province or a Tibetan from Xizang province/Tibet who has emigrated from China is not normally considered part of the Chinese diaspora, for instance, while the Manchus and the Mongolians from Inner Mongolia may or may not be considered part of the Chinese diaspora. The measure of inclusion appears to be the degree of sinicization of these ethnicities, which discloses a Han-centrism of a long-distance variety, because what often gets completely elided is the fact that the Chinese diaspora refers mainly to the diaspora of the Han people.

(Shu-mei Shih, *Visuality and Identity*)

2. Please translate the following passage into Chinese and then interpret it in your words (in Chinese): (25%)

The sex/gender distinction and the category of sex itself appear to presuppose a generalization of “the body” that preexists the acquisition of its sexed signification. This “body” often appears to be a passive medium that is signified by an inscription from a cultural source figured as “external” to that body. Any theory of the culturally constructed body, however, ought to question “the body” as a construct of suspect generality when it is figured as passive and prior to discourse.

(Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble*)

3. 請摘要下列文章重點，並提出你的看法。(25%)

Extracts from *Hybridity without Guarantees: Toward Critical Transculturalism* by Marwan Kraidy

Hybridity entails that traces of other cultures exist in every culture, thus offering foreign media and marketers transcultural wedges for forging affective links between their commodities and local communities. As a discourse of intercultural relations, hybridity conjures up an active exchange that leads to the mutual transformation of both sides. Mainstream public discourse frames this exchange as benign and beneficial. ... Hybridity, then, is not just amenable to globalization. It is the cultural logic of globalization...

...In many instances there are causal links between politico-economic power and cultural hybridity. This, however, does not mean that hybridity is tantamount to an effect of dominance. The processes and outcomes of hybridity are too convoluted to be explained by an always already direct politico-economic causality. Consequently, in order to understand the complex and active links between hybridity and power, we need to move beyond commonplace models of domination and resistance.

Critical transculturalism is designed to help us accomplish this task..

Critical transculturalism is a framework that focuses on power in intercultural relations by integrating both agency and structure... Critical transculturalism reclaims the notion of hybridity from doctrinaire free marketeers. It redefines cultural fusion as a social issue with human implications, from its earlier definition as an economic matter with commercial implications. People's identities may be refracted through individual consumption, cultural and otherwise, but consumption alone is not tantamount to being. Hybridity theory, and cultural theory at large, cannot consider people merely as individuals who constantly recreate themselves by way of consumption. Rather, agency must be grasped in terms of people's ability to accomplish things in the world they inhabit. If culture represents the meanings, ways of action, and ways to evaluate the value of actions in a society, and if cultural hybridity entails a change in those meanings and actions, then attention ought to be paid to hybridity's ability or inability to empower social groups to have influence over the course of their lives. Ultimately, then, the value of a theory of hybridity resides in the extent to which it emphasizes human agency

... Critical transculturalism advocates doing away with the view that cultures are stable and autonomous units,... to reclaim power as a major and legitimate focus of research, it is important to view cultures as synthetic entities whose hybrid components are shaped by structural and discursive forces. Critical transculturalism ...emphasizes that intercultural relations are unequal. ...The consideration of hybridity in tandem with power is perhaps best captured by the term "intercontextuality" which allows us to understand text and context to be mutually constitutive. As used here, "context" does not refer merely to a natural environment or a social setting where practices are put in motion and texts find their interpretative frames. Rather, I employ "context" as a constitutive and constituting force in the sense that ... "context is not something *out there*, within which practices occur or which influences the development of practices. Rather, identities, practices, and effects generally, constitute the very context with which they are practices, identities or effects". Using the notion of intercontextuality, we can maintain that hybridity is always already permeated with power, without, however, arguing in favor of a generalized hegemonic outcome. In other words, while most hybridities tend to be structured in dominance, the resulting hybrid forms and identities are not always and not necessarily reflective of total dominance.

.. Our attention, then, needs to be redirected from debating the political and theoretical usefulness of hybridity, to analyzing how structures and discourses operate in a variety of contexts to shape different hybridities, and how, in turn, hybrid cultural forms... reflect at once the presence of hegemony and its limitations.

4. 請摘要下列文章重點，並提出你的見解。(25%)

What Kind of Country Does Taiwan Want to Be?

Who's Taiwanese

by Kerim Friedman

Before I became a Taiwanese citizen I was a *waiguoren* (外國人), a “foreigner.” Now that I am a citizen, am I still a *waiguoren*? I was a bit surprised at first, but it makes sense. *Waiguoren*, like the Hokkien *a-tok-á* (阿斗仔, “straight nose”), is as much an ethnic marker as it is a statement of one’s nationality. Personally, I prefer to call myself a “new immigrant” in Mandarin (新住民), but it is a bit strange for Taiwanese when I call myself that because the term is mostly associated with foreign brides from Southeast Asia.

I’m clearly a white guy, but my not too distant ancestors were not always “white.” I am the descendent of Jewish immigrants to the United States, and when they first arrived Jews had not yet been accepted as white. That changed after World War II, and Jews are kind-of-white now, although the shouts of “Jews will not replace us” in Charlottesville served as an ugly reminder that our whiteness remains a provisional (and largely urban) phenomenon. But just as Taiwanese become “Asian” or even “Chinese” when they immigrate to the U.S., I became a generic “American” white guy when I came to Taiwan.

After I became a citizen I thought that maybe I should call myself an American-Taiwanese, mirroring the hyphenated identities of Taiwanese-Americans. But the way multiculturalism works in the two countries is not the same. Taiwanese-Americans, like other Asian Americans, exist in the buffer zone within a bi-racial caste system that is the legacy of slavery. The term “Asian American” was coined at Berkeley in the sixties, and was inspired by the Black Power Movement. Over time, however, this kind of radical pan-Asianism has given way to a more fractured landscape of culturally and nationally specific identities. In choosing whether to call themselves Asian-, Chinese- or Taiwanese-Americans, many young people still find themselves face to face with the legacy of the Kuomintang’s (KMT) state-sponsored ethnonationalism.

American-Taiwanese like myself, on the other hand, are still too few in Taiwan to even register as an ethnic group. And most of us are first-generation immigrants, so issues of ethnic identity are less fraught. Moreover, few of us face the ethnic discrimination here that Asians in the U.S. still face on a daily basis. But it would be a mistake to claim, as Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson did in April, that the “concept of

racism does not exist in Taiwan.” Despite official rhetoric celebrating multiculturalism, racial discrimination is a very real problem in Taiwan, especially against Indigenous and migrant worker populations.

Taiwanese racism is in many ways a legacy of the ethnonationalism that helped spark the 1911 Xinhai Revolution in China. A combination of anti-Manchism and anti-imperialism, Han ethnonationalism served as a useful reversal of the colonial rhetoric that the Chinese people were not ready for democracy or self-rule. Ironically, however, when the KMT came to Taiwan this ethnonationalism was retooled as an instrument for suppressing democracy and self-rule in Taiwan. Generations of Taiwanese were taught that their shared ethnocultural heritage unified China and Taiwan. This logic shaped the status of Taiwanese citizenship as well, with the descendants of Republic of China (ROC) citizens from around the world being granted a fast track to Taiwanese citizenship — a policy akin to the “Law of Return” for Jews migrating to Israel.

It is important to point out that such ethnonationalism has a gendered dimension as well. State promotion of “Confucian values” also meant state promotion of patriarchy. Up until quite recently, Taiwanese ethnicity was determined by that of the father. The children of an Indigenous Pangcah (Amis) woman and a Taiwanese who had emigrated from China after 1945 would be listed as *waishengren* (外省人), even though Pangcah is a matrilineal culture. Similarly, children of Taiwanese women and non-ROC nationals would not be eligible to attend local schools, since they were not considered citizens.

If Taiwan is now moving away from official ethnonationalism and embracing multiculturalism, much of that has to do with the ways in which China is deploying ethnonationalism as a justification for its territorial claims over Taiwan. Such views are also what China uses to justify the kidnapping and harassing non-PRC citizens who happen to be ethnic Chinese, as happened with the Swedish bookseller Gui Minhai and the Australian journalist Cheng Lei, among others. Although, as Brian Hioe has written, China’s relationship to the Chinese diaspora has not always been so welcoming, having “gone through several inversions in the course of the 20th century.”

There is also no better symbol of Taiwanese sovereignty than its move to disassociate citizenship from Chineseness. Recently, a small number of “special foreign professionals,” like me, have been encouraged to apply for citizenship without having to give up our original nationality. But the egalitarianism of multicultural citizenship can’t erase the hierarchical logic of race which still shapes Taiwanese society. There is no denying the privilege associated with being a foreign professional, as opposed to an Indigenous Taiwanese or a migrant worker. I love my adopted home and am proud of counting myself among its new immigrant population. But I also firmly believe that Taiwan’s future will be safest if it can embrace a more equitable vision of citizenship, one not burdened by the racist legacy of ethnonationalism. I may always be a *waiguoren*, but that doesn’t mean that Taiwanese have to always think of themselves as Chinese.

In fact, recent opinion surveys show that most Taiwanese reject Chineseness as an identity, but, as Catherine Chou has written, Taiwanese citizenship laws still remain trapped in the logic of ethnonationalism. There are

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different laws for “ROC nationals” from Southeast Asia and their “non-‘Chinese’ counterparts.” Dual citizenship (like I have) is still considered a privilege for a select few. And Taiwan desperately needs a refugee law. Nor are such problems limited to foreigners. Indigenous people are often used as a symbol of Taiwan. Their likeness sold on keychains at the airport, Indigenous singers are invited to sing at the presidential inauguration, and Indigenous cultural performances are part of many pre-packaged tour group itineraries. But actual living Indigenous people are still often treated as second class citizens. It is not uncommon for Indigenous people to be mistaken for Southeast Asians, and their names (often appearing in Latin romanization on their official IDs) to be mistaken for “English” — despite the fact that all sixteen Indigenous languages now have official status in Taiwan. Immigrants to Taiwan are expected to pick a Chinese name. Imagine if they could pick an Indigenous name instead? Hopefully Taiwan can someday embrace the slogan of the long-running Indigenous protest movement, and proudly declare that “No one is an outsider” (沒有人是局外人).